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Removing Disfavored Faces from Facebook:
The Freedom of Speech Implications of Banning
Sex Offenders from Social Media
JONATHON HITZ*
INTRODUCTION
The question of how to rehabilitate convicted sex offenders is a complicated,
controversial, and pressing issue. States have chosen to answer this question in a
multitude of ways. States frequently impose restrictions on the activities of sex
offenders who are no longer in custody or under any form of supervised release,
and some states have recently passed statutes1 that ban certain classes of sex
offenders from using social media2 websites and Internet utilities.
These statutes are meant to serve the purpose of protecting children from
exploitation by sexual predators. Protecting children is an extremely important goal
that both federal and state governments should seek to achieve. Unfortunately,
child sexual abuse has been a very serious problem in this country for a long time,3
and it has been a problem that reaches people across socioeconomic status and
ethnic group boundaries.4 Child sexual abuse has received frequent media

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I would like to
thank my mother, Cindy Hitz, and my grandparents, Ed and Lilly Hitz, for their
unconditional love and support throughout law school and life. I would also like to thank
Professors Dawn Johnsen and Steve Sanders for their extraordinarily helpful comments and
support. Finally, a special thank you to the staff of the Indiana Law Journal for their
incredible editorial support and comments.
1. See infra Part II.A–C.
2. For the purposes of this Note, “social media” is used to reference the collection of
websites and Internet utilities that sex offenders are collectively banned from by section
35-42-4-12 of the Indiana Code, section 14:91.5 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, and
section 28:322.05 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska. However, because these statutes
suffer from ambiguities—possibly because it is difficult to draw clear lines between different
Internet websites and services—and are arguably overbroad, the definition given to “social
media” by these statutes is imprecise. See infra Part III. Primarily, “social media” should be
thought of as referring to instant messaging (websites and Internet utilities that facilitate oneto-one communication between two users), Internet chat rooms (websites and Internet
utilities that facilitate communication between a group of individuals), and social networking
websites (websites such as Facebook and Twitter that allow for the creation of a virtual
community though individual user accounts). These websites and utilities are what
legislators primarily had in mind when drafting social media ban statutes. See Doe v.
Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1105 (D. Neb. 2012) (detailing how one of the State of
Nebraska’s witnesses defined the aforementioned terms).
3. In the year 2000 there were approximately 88,000 substantiated or indicated
instances of child sexual abuse, accounting for approximately 10% of all officially reported
child abuse instances in the United States. Frank W. Putnam, Ten-Year Research Update
Review: Child Sexual Abuse, 42 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 269, 269–
70 (2003). However, even this quite substantial number of incidents amounted to a 41%
decrease from a 1992 peak of an estimated 149,800 incidents. Id.
4. Id. at 270. However, sexual abuse is more common against girls than boys. Id.
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attention,5 with shows like MSNBC’s To Catch a Predator keeping the public
focused on the potential dangers posed by online sexual predators.6
Sex offender recidivism, as with recidivism for all crimes, is a significant
concern. The Supreme Court has described the sex offender recidivism rate as
“frightening and high.”7 However, some studies have found that this popular
assumption is false.8 In fact, according to some data, sex offenders have the lowest
recidivism rates among different categories of criminal offenders.9 The recidivism
rate myth, the prevalence of sex offenses, the public scrutiny of sex offenses, and
the heinous nature of sex offenses are all factors that have contributed to the
adoption of social media ban statutes.
This Note scrutinizes the constitutionality of statutes that ban sex offenders who
are no longer under any form of probation, parole, or supervised release from using
social media. This Note argues that the incarnations of three of the social media ban
statutes that have been examined by the federal judiciary were properly found
unconstitutional10 because they violate the free speech rights of the sex offenders
that they ban from social media.11 This Note goes on to argue that states can secure

(citing several studies all showing a greater incidence rate among girls than boys).
5. The issue is frequently covered, but some commentators express displeasure with
the way in which it is covered. Pamela Mejia, Andrew Cheyne & Lori Dorfman, News
Coverage of Child Sexual Abuse and Prevention, 2007–2009, 21 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
470, 471–72, 480–83 (2012) (finding that child sexual abuse appears regularly in news
coverage, but expressing displeasure with the depth of the coverage and what is covered; the
media mostly covers only “milestones” reached in the criminal justice system, but provides a
minimal amount of coverage related to the prevention of child sexual abuse).
6. Michael T. Martinez, Paper Presented in the Philosophy Division at the International
Communication Association Conference, Chicago: “To Catch a Predator:” An Ethical
Analysis of Sting Journalism 19 (May 2009), available at http://pressacademy.org
/sites/default/files/resources_pdf/sting%20j.pdf (explaining that To Catch a Predator
benefited society by bringing the issue of child predators to the public’s attention and
facilitated some arrests, but ultimately concluding that the show was unethical).
7. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
8. R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussière, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of
Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 357
(1998) (“The present findings contradict the popular view that sexual offenders inevitably
reoffend. Only a minority of the total sample (13.4% of 23,393) were known to have
committed a new sexual offense within the average 4- to 5-year follow-up period examined
in this study. . . . [E]ven in studies with thorough records searches and long follow-up
periods (15–20 years), the recidivism rates almost never exceeded 40%.”).
9. Paul Heroux, Sex Offenders: Recidivism, Re-Entry Policy and Facts, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 8, 2012, 2:39 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-heroux/sex
-offenders-recidivism_b_976765.html.
10. This Note will take the position, however, that some of the goals in passing these
statutes can be achieved through constitutional means. See infra Part IV.
11. This is a similar conclusion to an earlier published note; however, this Note reaches
this conclusion through a different path. See Jasmine S. Wynton, Note, Myspace, Yourspace,
but Not Theirspace: The Constitutionality of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Networking
Sites, 60 DUKE L.J. 1859 (2011). Ms. Wynton’s note examines the issue through the First
Amendment’s guarantee of the freedom of association. Id. at 1860–61.
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the interests they were seeking to protect in adopting these statutes through other
means.
Part I of this Note examines the importance of social media in today’s society by
detailing what groups of individuals use social media, how many individuals use
social media, and how these individuals use social media.12 Part II scrutinizes the
development of social media bans and takes a detailed look at the social media bans
initially passed by Indiana, Louisiana, and Nebraska.13 Part III examines the
constitutionality of social media bans by analyzing the extent of the First
Amendment’s protection for sex offenders who are no longer on probation, parole,
or supervised release and wish to use social media; analyzing the proper First
Amendment doctrine to apply to social media bans; and analyzing the cases that
examine the constitutionality of the social media bans initially passed by Indiana,
Louisiana, and Nebraska.14 Finally, Part IV argues that there is constitutional
breathing room for a state or the federal government to craft a statute that properly
balances the government interest in protecting children with the First Amendment
rights of sex offenders who are no longer on probation, parole, or supervised
release.15
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN TODAY’S SOCIETY
As one federal court has acknowledged, “[S]ocial networking web sites, instant
messaging, and chat rooms [have] become ubiquitous in today’s society.”16 These
websites and utilities are powerful communicative and organizational tools; some
commentators have even suggested that these tools were indispensable assets to the
individuals who took part in the Arab Spring uprisings, which swept the Middle
East in the summer of 2012.17 This Part will examine which individuals use social
media, how many individuals use social media, and some of the useful purposes for
social media.18

12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. Doe v. Marion Cnty., No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 2376141, at *1
(S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012) (quoting plaintiff) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d, 705
F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013).
17. Saleem Kassim, Twitter Revolution: How the Arab Spring Was Helped by Social
Media, POLICYMIC (July 3, 2012), http://www.policymic.com/articles/10642/twitter
-revolution-how-the-arab-spring-was-helped-by-social-media (“In Arab countries, many
activists who played crucial roles in the Arab Spring used social networking as a key tool in
expressing their thoughts concerning unjust acts committed by the government.”).
18. This Note will primarily focus on the uses and benefits of social networking
websites. Chat rooms and instant messaging are useful utilities, but there is simply more
information available on the common uses of social networking websites, and out of the
three types of websites and utilities that social media ban statutes apply to, social networking
websites seem to be more closely related to a larger number of First Amendment freedoms.
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A. Who Uses Social Media
Social media websites and utilities are extremely popular. The most popular
social networking website, Facebook, has so many users that if the website’s users
formed “a country, it would be the third largest country in the world behind only
China and India.”19 Facebook has “more than one billion monthly active users”
worldwide20 and 171 million monthly active users in the United States alone.21
Sixty-six percent of all adults in the United States who use the Internet use
Facebook.22 Further, Facebook is a website that is used by adults regardless of age
group,23 and a 2011 study found that twenty million minors had actively used the
website in the past year.24 Currently, Facebook’s terms of service allow only
individuals thirteen years old and older to use the website,25 but Facebook is
considering allowing younger individuals access to the website through certain
parental controls.26 However, in spite of Facebook’s restrictions, many minors
under thirteen years of age do access the website. In 2011, 7.5 million active
Facebook users were under the age of thirteen.27
Facebook is not the only popular social networking website. Twitter and
LinkedIn are also very popular, although they are not nearly as widely used as
Facebook.28 Both of these websites appeal to slightly different demographics.
Twitter appeals primarily to younger adults;29 LinkedIn appeals mostly to collegeeducated individuals over the age of thirty.30 There are other popular social

19. ERIK QUALMAN, SOCIALNOMICS: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA TRANSFORMS THE WAY WE
LIVE AND DO BUSINESS, at xvii (2d ed. 2013).
20. SEC, FACEBOOK, QUARTERLY REPORT, SEC FORM 10-Q 19 (2012),
http://investor.fb.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1326801-12-6&CIK=1326801.
21. Id. at 20.
22. LEE RAINIE, JOANNA BRENNER & KRISTEN PURCELL, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT, PHOTOS AND VIDEOS AS SOCIAL CURRENCY ONLINE 3 (2012), available at
http://pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_OnlineLifeinPictures_PDF.pdf.
23. The percentage of individuals using Facebook in given age groups does vary;
nonetheless, 40% of Internet users at or over the age of sixty-five use Facebook. See id. at 13.
24. Online Exposure, CONSUMER REP., June 2011, at 29, 30.
25. Anton Troianovski & Shayndi Raice, Facebook Explores Giving Kids Access, WALL
ST. J., June 4, 2012, at A1.
26. Id.
27. Online Exposure, supra note 24, at 30.
28. Twenty percent of adult Internet users use LinkedIn, while 16% use Twitter. Rainie
et al., supra note 22, at 3. While Rainie’s study demonstrates that LinkedIn is slightly more
popular than Twitter with adult Internet users, Twitter is more popular than LinkedIn overall,
with more than 200 million monthly active users, compared to 187 million monthly active
users for LinkedIn. Seth Fiegerman, Twitter Now Has More than 200 Million Monthly Active
Users, MASHABLE (Dec. 18, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/12/18/twitter-200-millionactive-users/.
29. Rainie et al., supra note 22, at 15 (finding that 27% of Internet users ages eighteen
to twenty-nine use Twitter, while only 15% of Internet users ages thirty to forty-nine and
12% of Internet users ages fifty to sixty-four use the website).
30. Id. at 14 (finding that 25% of Internet users ages thirty to forty-nine and 22% of
Internet users ages fifty to sixty-four use LinkedIn, while only 16% of Internet users eighteen to
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networking websites,31 and there are even more websites that arguably serve a
social networking function but are too numerous to mention.32
Instant messaging is also an extremely popular element of social media. “[M]ore
than four in ten online Americans instant message,”33 and “[o]n a typical day, 12%
of internet users” will use an instant messaging service.34 Instant messaging is
beginning to appear as a built-in feature on many popular social networking
websites, like Facebook.35 This type of service is also making inroads into the
workplace: 40% of users of instant messaging in the workplace report that it has
improved teamwork, and 50% of users of instant messaging in the workplace have
reported that it helps save time.36
B. The Usefulness of Social Media
Listing all the possible uses of social media goes well beyond the scope of this
Note; however, this Note will make an effort to list the most popular and important
uses of social media, with a particular emphasis on the most popular website,
Facebook.
Many of the potential uses of social media go hand-in-hand with the freedoms
that the Supreme Court has made clear are at the core of the First Amendment’s
protection.37 Social networks have the principal purpose of facilitating interactions
twenty-nine use the website, and that 36% of Internet users who graduated from college use the
website, while only 7% of Internet users who did not attend college use the website).
31. Pinterest (12% of adult Internet users), Instagram (12% of adult Internet users), and
Tumblr (5% of adult Internet users) are some notable examples. See id. at 10–12.
32. The exceptionally large number of social networking websites can be partially
attributed to the problems encountered when attempting to precisely define the term “social
networking website.” See infra Part III.C.1.
33. EULYNN SHIU & AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, HOW
AMERICANS USE INSTANT MESSAGING, at i (2004), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org
/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Society_and_the_Internet/pew_internet_instant
_message_090104.pdf.
34. Id.
35. See Josh Wiseman, Facebook Chat: Now We’re Talking, FACEBOOK BLOG (Apr. 6,
2008, 2:33 AM), https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?blog_id=company&blogger=219074
(announcing the launch of Facebook Chat, an instant messaging service that is automatically
accessible from Facebook accounts).
36. Shiu & Lenhart, supra note 33, at ii. Not everyone has had such a positive
experience with instant messaging in the workplace. “[Thirty-two percent] say [instant
messaging] at work encourages gossip; 29% say [it] has been distracting, and 11% say it has
added stress to their lives.” Id.
37. These uses of social media include communicating ideas, taking part in political
speech, associating with like-minded individuals, and receiving ideas from others. See Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 728 (2000) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the right of every
citizen to ‘reach the minds of willing listeners.’” (quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1991))); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“When a law burdens core political speech, we apply ‘exacting
scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding
state interest.” (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978))); Bd. of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he right to receive ideas
follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them.” (emphasis in
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between individuals. This principal purpose makes social networks a key element
in an individual’s effective exercise of his or her right to freedom of speech and
association. Because so many people use these websites and services, it is easy to
see why they are collectively a powerful communicative and associational tool.
Social media has morphed into a tool that a respectable percentage of
individuals see as critical to their active and competent participation in the political
process.38 Both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney used social networking websites,
such as Facebook, in their 2012 presidential campaigns in an effort to energize the
electorate in their favor.39 During the 2012 presidential campaign, the “GOP
convention was one of the most talked about news events of the year on
Facebook.”40 Further, the Republican Party’s convention drew five million tweets
on Twitter.41
Social networks and other social media were principally designed to facilitate
communication and interactions in the virtual world. Social networks have
enhanced communication to such an extent that they have created unprecedented
additional benefits. Social networks have proved to be an exceptionally useful
organizational and planning tool for real-world protests and assemblies.42 Further,
these networks have increased personal transparency; some commentators argue
that this consequence is beneficial for individuals and society because transparency
forces individuals to be themselves in all aspects of their life (as opposed to
maintaining a professional life personality and a personal life personality), thus
reducing the stress of “social schizophrenia.”43 Social networking has also gained

original)); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Implicit in
the First Amendment freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition is the freedom to gather
together to express ideas—the freedom to associate.” (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66–69 (2006))).
38. See LEE RAINIE & AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, POLITICS ON
SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 2 (2012), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports
/2012/Politics-on-SNS.aspx (finding that 36% of individuals who use social networking
websites say that the websites are either “‘very important’ or ‘somewhat important’ to them
in keeping up with political news”).
39. Id. at 5; see also QUALMAN, supra note 19, at 50–56 (explaining how Barack Obama
used social media as an asset in his rise to the presidency).
40. Beth Fouhy, For Conventions, TV Viewing Down, Social Media Up, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Sept. 3, 2012, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/conventions-tv-viewing
-down-social-media-0.
41. Id. One reason social networks have become such a popular platform for political
expression and news gathering is that they allow people to participate from anywhere.
People no longer need to be at the convention or tied to their television set; they can
participate on their computers and other mobile electronic devices. Id.
42. Kassim, supra note 17 (quoting an Arab Spring activist in Egypt who explained that
protestors used Facebook to schedule protests).
43. See QUALMAN, supra note 19, at 95–98 (arguing that the increased transparency
created by social media is positive, but that this transparency can have serious consequences,
especially when people try to be someone else through social media—an example of this
would be the case of a mother who may have caused the suicide of one of her daughter’s
former friends by pretending to be a teenage boy and harassing the former friend).
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tremendous traction in the business world; a 2011 study found that nearly 74% of
companies44 used Facebook and 73% used LinkedIn.45
This Note would be incomplete without answering an important question: How
do the sex offenders affected by social media ban statutes want to use these
resources? States that have implemented social media bans point to the nefarious
purposes to which these resources may be put.46 A 2006 study found that one in
seven youths had experienced unwelcomed sexual solicitation over the Internet,
and one in three youths had experienced unwelcomed exposure to sexual material
over the Internet.47 Many of these unwelcomed experiences likely occurred through
the use of social media, as social media represents the dominant form of
communication on the Internet.48
In spite of the possible nefarious uses, some individuals who are banned from
social media by social media bans wish to put these tools to legitimate use. One
example is the John Doe plaintiff who brought suit in Doe v. Marion County. John
Doe wanted to use social networks for a variety of legitimate purposes, such as
using “Facebook to monitor his teenage son’s social networking activity,”49 to
participate in political speech that can only be accomplished through social
networks, to advertise for his small business, to “view photographs and videos of
family members who are scattered throughout the United States,”50 to communicate
with other members of his profession, and to join in petitions that are relevant to his
profession.51 Because social media is such a useful tool in modern society, it is
unsurprising that some sex offenders would want to use social media for legitimate
purposes.

44. The study used a sample of companies listed on the Inc. 500, “an elite group of the
fastest-growing companies in the United States.” NORA GANIM BARNES & AVA M. LESCAULT,
THE 2011 INC. 500 SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE: BLOGGING DECLINES AS NEWER TOOLS RULE 4,
available at http://www.umassd.edu/media/umassdartmouth/cmr/studiesandresearch/2011
_Inc500.pdf.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Doe v. Marion Cnty., No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 2376141, at *2
(S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012) (noting that Indiana passed its social media ban in an effort “to
combat online sexual exploitation”), rev’d, 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013). For a more
thorough examination of social networking in the workplace, see Christina Parajon Skinner,
The Unprofessional Sides of Social Media and Social Networking: How Current Standards
Fall Short, 63 S.C. L. REV. 241, 251–53 (2011).
47. JANIS WOLAK, KIMBERLY MITCHELL & DAVID FINKELHOR, CRIMES AGAINST
CHILDREN RESEARCH CTR, ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER, at vii
(2006), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf.
48. “Social media” as used in this Note is not meant to include e-mail, which is arguably
the most dominant form of Internet communication. E-mail, however, does not seem to be
the primary target of these statutes (although some of the statutes are probably broad enough
to include e-mail within their definitions of banned websites). The communications that are
of concern are more likely to be sent over social networks and other forms of social media
because these services facilitate interaction and introduction between individuals, while
e-mail—although capable of fulfilling these functions—is less well-suited for this task.
49. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 2012 WL 2376141, at *5.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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II. SEX OFFENDER SOCIAL MEDIA BANS
Sex offenders, as a group, are widely believed to be plagued with an extremely
high recidivism rate.52 Possibly because of this belief, state legislators and federal
courts occasionally overreach and push the boundaries of constitutionally
permissible action in their efforts to combat the threat of sex offender recidivism.53

52. The Supreme Court has described this rate as “frightening and high.” Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). However, this belief in a high recidivism rate may be misplaced. See Doe,
2012 WL 2376141, at *8 n.5 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (“‘Conventional wisdom says people released
after serving time for sex crimes are likely to strike again. The numbers aren’t as certain.
Among convicted criminals released from prison, sex offenders released from prison are less
likely to be arrested for any new crime than most other offenders, with the notable exception of
murderers, researchers say.’” (quoting Carl Bialik, Underreporting Clouds Attempt to Count
Repeat Sex Offender, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2008, at B1)). A 2003 Department of Justice study
showed that sex offenders are more likely to be rearrested for another sex crime than offenders
who are released for non-sex crimes. Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt & Matthew R.
Durose, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 198281, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 1–2 (2003) (finding that sex offenders were “[four] times
more likely to be rearrested for a sex crime” than non–sex offenders, but finding that “sex
offenders had a lower overall rearrest rate” than non–sex offenders). The same study found the
sex offender recidivism rate for sex offenses to be 5.3%. Id. at 1. Notwithstanding these
findings, there are significant difficulties in measuring sex offender recidivism rates, including
difficulties in defining the sex offender population—a wide array of offenses are often termed
“sex offenses” and this causes sex offenders to be a highly heterogeneous group of individuals
(it may not be analytically helpful to analyze the recidivism rates of a group of individuals that
potentially includes individuals that committed such varying offenses as rape, possession of
child pornography, and incest); difficulties in defining recidivism (does this term mean
subsequent arrest—as used by the aforementioned Department of Justice study—subsequent
conviction, or subsequent incarceration?); underreporting of certain sex crimes to the
authorities (particularly rape and child sexual assault); and the length of time before a study
“follows-up” (the longer the follow-up period, the greater chance that repeat offense will
occur). See CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS 1–4 (2001),
available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.pdf.
53. Efforts by states that arguably violate constitutional limits include (but are not limited
to) chemical castration for certain classes of sex offenders, CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West
2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (2013); Matthew V. Daley, Note, A Flawed Solution to
the Sex Offender Situation in the United States: The Legality of Chemical Castration for Sex
Offenders, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 87 (2008) (arguing that chemical castration is both
misguided and unconstitutional); long-term (potentially even life-long) civil commitment, see
Tanya Kessler, Comment, “Purgatory Cannot Be Worse Than Hell”: The First Amendment
Rights of Civilly Committed Sex Offenders, 12 N.Y. CITY. L. REV. 283 (2009) (arguing that civil
commitment disregards individual constitutional rights); and, the topic of this Note, social
media bans. Efforts by federal courts that arguably violate constitutional limits include (but are
not limited to) banning sex offenders from possessing any material containing nudity or that
“alludes to sexual activity,” United States v. Simons, 614 F.3d 475, 483–85 (8th Cir. 2010)
(distinguishing court of appeals cases that upheld special conditions of release that banned the
possession of pornography as being more narrow than the condition imposed by the district
court, and finding that the district court plainly erred in imposing a condition that banned the
defendant from possessing “any material, legal or illegal, that contains nudity or that depicts or
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However, it is exceptionally difficult to determine whether these extreme measures
are being used against individuals who are likely to commit another sex offense.54
Despite the inherent difficulty of predicting which sex offenders continue to pose a
threat to society, state and federal courts seem to be becoming more willing to
reduce the online freedoms of convicted sex offenders through the imposition of
conditions of probation, parole, and supervised release.55
Statutory restrictions of the online freedom of sex offenders are even more
onerous than those imposed by courts. Conditions imposed by courts are more
tailored to an individual offender than the blanket social media bans imposed by
statute.56 A court has an opportunity to analyze each individual offender, while a
legislator must vote for or against a particular law based on broad generalizations.
Despite the obvious advantages of allowing the courts to impose post–prison
release conditions on offenders, several states have passed statutes that
categorically ban certain types of sex offenders from using social media, even after
they are no longer on probation, parole, or supervised release. This Note will focus
on the bans originally passed by Indiana,57 Louisiana,58 and Nebraska59 because
alludes to sexual activity or depicts sexually arousing material”); total Internet bans, see, e.g.,
United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 876–78 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring that conditions of
supervised release involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary and
striking down a total Internet ban as a condition of probation imposed by a federal district court
because it did not comport to the narrow tailoring requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3583). But see
United States v. Angle, 598 F.3d 352 (7th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing Holm and upholding a ban
on “‘personal’ access to Internet services” where the defendant’s conviction involved Internet
use and his profession did not require him to use the Internet); and total bans on the possession
of computers, United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 636–39 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the
district court abused its discretion in imposing a condition of supervised release that banned a
sex offender from possessing a computer because the condition deprived the defendant of more
liberty than was reasonably necessary).
54. See Fredrick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders, 44 CONN.
L. REV. 161, 193 (2011) (concluding that even the best researched tool for predicting
recidivism was likely not good enough to meet the legal standard for sex offender civil
commitment).
55. See Wynton, supra note 11, at 1861–66. The constitutionality of these prohibitions is
beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses exclusively on conditions imposed by state
legislators on sex offenders no longer on probation, parole, or supervised release.
56. See id. at 1867. In fact, the conditions of supervised release imposed by federal courts
are required to meet a “narrow tailoring” requirement by federal law. Holm, 326 F.3d at 877
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583).
57. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12 (2008), amended by Act of May 11, 2013, Pub. L. No. 2472013, sec. 8, § 12, 2013 Ind. Acts 3384, 3398. The Indiana social media ban was amended to
apply only to individuals on probation, parole, or taking part in a community transition
program. The amendments were a response to the Seventh Circuit ruling that Indiana’s original
social media ban was unconstitutional. See Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir.
2013).
58. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), amended by Act of May 22, 2012, No. 205,
§ 14:91.5, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 205 (H.B. 620) (West). Louisiana amended and
narrowed this statute in 2012 after it was found unconstitutional by a federal district court. The
amendments will be discussed later in this Note. See infra Part IV.
59. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-322.05 (LexisNexis 2009), held unconstitutional, Doe v.
Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (D. Neb. 2012). Kentucky and North Carolina have also
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these three statutes have been analyzed by the federal judiciary. In Part IV, this
Note will scrutinize the constitutionality of the updated social media bans that were
passed by Indiana and Louisiana after their original bans were found to be
unconstitutional.60
The original statutes passed by these three states all have the same goal: prevent
potential harm to children by restricting sex offenders’ access to social media.
However, the three states strive to accomplish the goal in slightly different ways.
Because there are some nuanced differences between the statutes of Indiana,
Louisiana, and Nebraska, this Part will examine each statute and its differences
from the others thoroughly.61 The important details about each statute that will be
addressed herein are (1) who the statute applies to, (2) what the statute’s definition
of social media is, and (3) the characteristics that are unique to each statute.
A. Indiana’s 2012 Statute Banning Sex Offenders from Social Media
Indiana’s statute applied to sex offenders who were required to register as a sex
or violent offender62 for committing one or more of several enumerated offenses.63
The offenses listed in Indiana’s statute were primarily crimes against children;
however, the statute also applied to individuals who were required to register as
“sexually violent predators.”64 Individuals in Indiana who are required to register as
sexually violent predators include those who have committed rape,65 criminal
deviate conduct,66 or a sex offense67 “while having a previous unrelated conviction
passed statutes that ban sex offenders from using social media after they are no longer on
probation, parole, or supervised release. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.546 (LexisNexis Supp.
2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5 (West Supp. 2012).
60. See infra Part IV. Indiana’s new statute will be discussed very briefly because the
newly amended statute is significantly different from its original form and no longer applies to
sex offenders who are not on probation, parole, or supervised release—such statutes are the
focus of this Note. See supra note 57.
61. See infra Parts II.A–C.
62. An adult can be required to register as a sex or violent offender for two different
reasons: (1) committing one of a multitude of different sex offenses; or (2) committing the
violent crimes of murder and voluntary manslaughter. A child can be required to register as a
sex or violent offender if they would be required to register as an adult, they are at least
fourteen years of age, and they are found likely to repeat the act by clear and convincing
evidence. See IND. CODE § 11-8-8-4.5 (Supp. 2013) (defining “sex offender”); id. § 11-8-8-5
(defining “sex or violent offender”).
63. Indiana’s social media ban statute applied to those who committed the crimes of child
molestation, child exploitation, possession of child pornography, vicarious sexual gratification
(which can be summarily described as inducing a child to engage in masturbation or
intercourse, id. § 35-42-4-5(a)–(b)), sexual conduct in the presence of a minor, child
solicitation, child seduction, and kidnapping of a victim less than eighteen years old that is not
the offender’s child. Id. § 35-42-4-12(b)(2)(A)–(H).
64. Id. § 35-42-4-12(b)(1).
65. Id. § 35-42-4-1 (defining rape).
66. Id. § 35-42-4-2 (repealed 2014) (defining criminal deviate conduct). Effective July 1,
2014, the criminal deviate conduct statute has been repealed by the Indiana legislature, 2013
Ind. Legis. Serv. 158-2013 (West), but individuals who committed the crime before its repeal
are still required to register as sex or violent offenders. Id. § 11-8-8-5(a)(2).
67. Id. § 11-8-8-5.2 (2010) (defining sex offense).
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for a sex offense for which the person is required to register as a sex or violent
offender under [Indiana’s sex and violent offender registration laws].”68 Under
Indiana’s definition of “sexually violent predator,” there is no requirement that an
offender have completed their crimes against a child.
Indiana’s statute made an important exception for some offenders; this
exception was referred to by some as the “Romeo and Juliet” exception.69
Essentially, individuals who became sex offenders as a result of a dating
relationship with someone who was underage but near the offender in age were free
from the social media ban, but for the exception to apply, an offender’s crime was
required to satisfy a large number of conditions.70 Because the exception demanded
the satisfaction of a laundry list of requirements, it was relatively narrow, but
nonetheless, the exception did cut the number of sex offenders to which the social
media ban was applicable.
Indiana’s statute banned sex offenders from both social networking websites and
instant messaging or chat room programs.71 The statute defined a “social
networking website” as an Internet site that facilitates introduction between people;
requires a person to register or create an account, a username, or a
password to become a member of the web site and to communicate
with other members; . . . allows a member to create a web page or
personal profile; and . . . provides a member with the opportunity to
communicate with another person.72
The statute defined both “instant messaging” and “chat room” as “a software
program that requires a person to register or create an account, a username, or a
password to become a member or registered user of the program and allows two . . .
or more members or authorized users to communicate over the Internet in real time

68. Id. § 35-38-1-7.5(b)(2). Individuals who have committed sex crimes as minors or
who have committed certain crimes against children may also be required to register as
sexually violent predators. Id. § 35-38-1-7.5(b)(4).
69. Doe v. Marion Cnty., No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 2376141, at *4
(S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012), rev’d, 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013).
70. For the exception to have applied, (1) the offender must have committed his or her
crime against a victim who was close to the offender in age (within four or five years
depending on the date of the offense), (2) the offender must have been involved in some sort
of a dating relationship with the victim or an “ongoing personal relationship” (unfortunately,
“ongoing personal relationship” is not clearly defined; the statute simply makes it clear that
this term “does not include a family relationship”), (3) the offender must have not been
twenty-one years old or older when he or she committed the offense, (4) the offender must
not have carried out the offense by using or threatening the use of deadly force, (5) the
offender must not have been armed with a deadly weapon while committing the offense, (6)
the offender must not have carried out the offense by drugging the victim or causing the
victim to fall under the influence of a controlled substance without the victim’s knowledge,
(7) the offender must not have carried out the offense while in a position of authority or
substantial influence over the victim, and (8) the offender must not have inflicted serious
bodily injury in carrying out the offense. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12(a).
71. Id. § 35-42-4-12(e).
72. Id. § 35-42-4-12(d).
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using typed text.”73 Indiana excluded electronic mail programs (e-mail) and
message boards from its original social media ban.74 Indiana also excluded websites
that do not allow individuals who are under eighteen years old to access the site.
The statute seemed to be primarily directed at preventing sex offenders from using
websites like Facebook and Twitter that allow the creation of an account and
facilitate organization among groups of friends and individuals with common
interests, programs that allow private computer-to-computer communication via
typed text, and programs that allow groups of people to communicate via text in
Internet chat rooms.
Indiana’s statute used some of the most detailed definitions for the social media
websites to which it applied. Compared to the other three statutes discussed in this
Part, Indiana’s statute was unique in its use of a “Romeo and Juliet” exception for
offenders that were close to the age of their victim at the time of the crime.
Indiana’s statute was arguably the narrowest statute in terms of the social media
websites to which it applied; however, even when considering the “Romeo and
Juliet” exception, Indiana’s statute applied to a broader category of offenders than
the statutes of Louisiana and Nebraska.75
B. Louisiana’s 2011 Statute Banning Sex Offenders from Social Media
Louisiana’s original statute that banned sex offenders from social media76
applied to a number of different classes of sex offenders. All individuals who were
required to register as sex offenders77 and who were convicted of indecent behavior
with juveniles,78 pornography involving juveniles,79 computer-aided solicitation of
a minor,80 or video voyeurism81 were banned from social media.82 Louisiana’s
statute applied primarily to offenders who committed their offenses against

73. Id. § 35-42-4-12(c).
74. Id. § 35-42-4-12(c)–(d).
75. See infra Parts II.B–C.
76. This section explores the details of Louisiana’s original statute because this was the
statute that was examined by a federal court, and knowledge of the specific provisions of
Louisiana’s original statute will be important in understanding the case that explores its
constitutionality. The details of Louisiana’s updated statute will be explored later in this
Note. See infra Part IV.
77. Essentially anyone who is convicted of a sex offense (as defined by section
15:541(24)(a) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, which lists a number of different offenses
ranging from rape to incest) or is convicted of a criminal offense against a minor is required
to register as a sex offender in Louisiana. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542(A)(1)(a)–(b) (Supp.
2013).
78. Id. § 14:81 (defining indecent behavior with juveniles).
79. Id. § 14:81.1 (defining pornography involving juveniles).
80. Id. § 14:81.3 (defining computer-aided solicitation of a minor).
81. Id. § 14:283 (defining video voyeurism).
82. Id. § 14:91.5 (2012), amended by Act of May 22, 2012, No. 205, § 14:91.5, 2012
La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 205 (H.B. 620) (West). Louisiana’s social media ban statute also
applied more broadly to anyone who committed a sex offense against a minor. Id.
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children; however, video voyeurism, as defined by Louisiana law, does not require
the victim to be a minor.83
The statute banned sex offenders from “social networking websites, chat rooms,
and peer-to-peer networks.”84 The definitions used by Louisiana were similar to
those used by Indiana;85 however, Louisiana opted for a substantially broader
definition for “social networking website” than Indiana. Louisiana’s definition
encompassed a large portion of the Internet, including e-mail services and basic
newspaper websites.86 The statue also banned access to any peer-to-peer network,
which was defined as “a connection of computer systems whereby files are shared
directly between the systems on a network without the need of a central server.”87
Louisiana’s statute was unique of the three discussed in this Part in that it
banned both use and access to social media.88 This trait may have made an
individual liable simply for viewing a site’s terms of use to determine if the website
fit the statutory definition for any of the banned websites. Further, Louisiana’s
statute was the only statute with a built-in safety valve. The statute allowed an
offender to seek permission to use social media from his or her “probation or parole
officer or the court of original jurisdiction.”89 Louisiana’s statute was further
unique in that, as mentioned earlier, it included peer-to-peer networks in the group
of websites that it banned sex offenders from using or accessing.90 Finally,
Louisiana’s statute was the only statute that did not carve out an exception for
websites that do not allow individuals under the age of eighteen to access the
website.91

83. See id. § 14:283 (Supp. 2013).
84. Id. § 14:91.5(A)(1) (2012).
85. Louisiana’s original statute defined a “chat room” as “any Internet website through
which users have the ability to communicate via text and which allows messages to be
visible to all other users or to a designated segment of all other users.” Id. § 14:91.5(C)(1).
The original statute defined a “social networking website” as a site that “[a]llows users to
create web pages or profiles about themselves that are available to the general public or to
any other users . . . [or] [o]ffers a mechanism for communication among users, such as a
forum, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messaging.” Id. § 14:91.5(C)(4)(a)–(b).
86. See Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (M.D. La. 2012) (“[T]his Court
construes the Act to impose a sweeping ban on many commonly read news and information
websites, in addition to social networking websites such as MySpace and Facebook.”); see
also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5(C)(4) (explaining that a social networking websites
includes any website that “[o]ffers a mechanism for communication among users, such as
. . . electronic mail”).
87. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5(C)(3).
88. Id. § 14:91.5(A)(1).
89. Id. § 14:91.5(B). However, this protection has been criticized by the only federal
court to examine the statute. The federal court pointed out that “a state cannot create
jurisdiction for federal courts or for courts in other states.” Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at
605 (explaining that because of this issue, the exception would likely only be effective in
Louisiana; a federal court does not maintain jurisdiction after a convict has been released and
would not be able to grant an exception to individuals that it has already convicted).
90. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5(A)(1).
91. Id. § 14:91.5.
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C. Nebraska’s Statute Banning Sex Offenders from Social Media
Nebraska’s social media ban statute applies to sex offenders who are required to
register under Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act92 and have committed one
of several different offenses. These offenses include the kidnapping of a minor,93
sexual assault of a minor,94 incest of a minor,95 pandering of a minor,96 visual
depiction of the sexually explicit conduct of a child,97 possessing any visual
depiction of sexually explicit conduct,98 and criminally enticing a child.99 All of the
offenses that trigger applicability of Nebraska’s statute involve a minor.100
The statute crafted by Nebraska’s legislature applies to “social networking web
site[s], instant messaging [programs/websites], [and] chat room service[s]” that
permit access by individuals who are less than eighteen years of age.101 Nebraska’s
definition of a social networking website is similar to Indiana’s; however,
Nebraska’s definition is slightly more inclusive because it uses broader language.102
In spite of the broad definition given to social networking websites, the definitions
given to “instant messaging” 103 and “chat room”104 are relatively specific.

92. Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act lists a number of offenses that require
registration, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4003(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013), and it requires
registration for fifteen years, twenty-five years, or life (starting after the period of supervised
release, probation, or parole ends), id. § 29-4005(1).
93. Id. § 28-313.
94. Id. §§ 28-319.01, -320.01.
95. Id. § 28-703.
96. Id. § 28-802.
97. Id. §§ 28-1463.03, .05.
98. Id. § 28-813.01.
99. Id. §§ 28-311, -320.02.
100. Id. § 28-322.05(1) (LexisNexis 2009).
101. Id.
102. A “social networking web site” is a website or group of websites “that enables users
or subscribers to create, display, and maintain a profile or Internet domain containing
biographical data, personal information, photos, or other types of media, . . . that can be
searched, viewed, or accessed by other users or visitors to the web site, . . . [and] that may
permit some form of communication” between different users of the website.
Id. § 29-4001.01(13) (emphasis added). This can be compared with Indiana’s definition,
which uses more limiting language: “‘social networking web site’ means an Internet web site
that . . . requires a person to register . . . to communicate with other members.” IND. CODE
§ 35-42-4-12(d)(2) (Supp. 2013) (emphasis added). At the very least, it seems that only
websites that facilitate communication between account holders will fall into Indiana’s
definition, while websites that allow communication between non-account holders and
account holders could fall into Nebraska’s definition (because of the use of the word may as
opposed to requires).
103. “Instant messaging means a direct, dedicated, and private communication service,
accessed with a computer or electronic communication device, that enables a user of the
service to send and receive virtually instantaneous text transmissions . . . to other selected
users of the service through the Internet or a computer communications network . . . .” NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4001.01(10) (LexisNexis 2009).
104. “Chat room means a web site or server space on the Internet or communication
network primarily designated for the virtually instantaneous exchange of text or voice
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Nebraska’s statutory scheme uses some of the most detailed definitions for the
websites and Internet utilities that it bans sex offenders from. However, aside from
these differences, the statute does not have any unique characteristics that truly set
it apart from the other two statutes.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SOCIAL MEDIA BANS
Several important questions must be answered to determine whether it is
constitutional to ban certain classes of sex offenders from social media. First, this
Part will examine whether convicted sex offenders have First Amendment rights
that protect their access to social media.105 Second, this Part will examine which
First Amendment doctrine provides the most appropriate means of analysis for
social media bans.106 And third, this Part will apply the underlying constitutional
framework to the original social media ban statutes adopted by Indiana, Louisiana,
and Nebraska and conclude that, under current Supreme Court precedent, statutes
that ban sex offenders from social media are incompatible with the free speech
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.107
A. Sex Offenders Who Are on No Form of Supervised Release Are Guaranteed the
Full Protection of the First Amendment in Their Use of Social Media
This Part examines whether some uses of social media by convicted sex
offenders are protected by the First Amendment. Social media ban statutes only
affect the right of convicted sex offenders to access social media, so if convicted
sex offenders do not have rights under the First Amendment that protect access to
social media, there is no need to examine the constitutionality of social media bans
further. The social media bans of Indiana, Louisiana, and Nebraska apply fully to
individuals who are no longer on probation, parole, or any form of supervised
release.108 Therefore, this Part focuses on determining the extent of similarly
situated sex offenders’ First Amendment rights,109 and concludes that sex
offenders’ right to access social media is protected by the First Amendment.
transmissions or computer file attachments amongst two or more computers or electronic
communication device users . . . .” Id. § 29-4001.01(3).
105. See infra Part III.A. This Note does not address the extent to which the First
Amendment applies to the Internet. It seems “settled that the First Amendment’s protections
‘extend fully to communications made through the medium of the internet.’” Doe v. Marion
Cnty., No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 2376141, at *5 (S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012)
(quoting Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2010)), rev’d, 705 F.3d 694 (7th
Cir. 2013); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 866–68 (1997) (concluding that there
should be “stringent [First Amendment] review” of a statute that restricted access to explicit
material available on the Internet); Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d at 1222 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The
Supreme Court has also made clear that First Amendment protections for speech extend fully
to communications made through the medium of the internet.”).
106. See infra Part III.B.
107. See infra Part III.C.
108. These statutes also apply to individuals who may be on some form of probation,
parole, or supervised release. For a discussion of the constitutional rights held by individuals
on probation, parole, or supervised release, see Wynton, supra note 11, at 1878–81.
109. This Note does not examine the rights of sex offenders in prison or on probation,
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The Supreme Court has consistently made clear that even prisoners are
guaranteed some, albeit limited, protection under the U.S. Constitution. In the
words of the Supreme Court, “Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison
inmates from the protections of the Constitution.” 110 Prisoners are protected from
racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,
are entitled to petition for the redress of grievance, and are entitled to due
process.111
The Supreme Court has also extended additional constitutional protections to
individuals on probation, parole, and supervised release, such as a less robust
version of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy.112 In Griffin v.
Wisconsin,113 the Supreme Court explained that there is a “continuum of possible
punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a
few hours of mandatory community service.”114 Constitutional protections vary on
that continuum, with probationers and parolees both receiving privacy protection,
but with probationers receiving greater protection than parolees.115
If convicted felons are entitled to limited protection when they are in prison or
on probation, parole, or supervised release, they should be entitled to at least that
same level of protection once they are no longer under the supervision of the
criminal justice system. It would not be logically consistent with the continuum
concept that the Supreme Court articulated in Griffin v. Wisconsin for a felon’s
constitutional rights to decrease once they are no longer under the criminal justice
system’s supervision.116 An individual receives greater constitutional protection as
the punishment for their crime moves along the continuum from more liberty
intrusive to less liberty intrusive;117 therefore, once they are no longer being
punished, an individual should receive at least the same constitutional protections
that they would have received during the term of their punishment. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the extent to which the First
Amendment protects convicted felons;118 however, because prisoners enjoy limited
First Amendment protections,119 it seems that convicted felons are at least entitled
to some First Amendment protection. As one commentator has noted, after a felon
parole, or supervised release.
110. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
111. Id.
112. The Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy is inapplicable to individuals in
prison. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984).
113. 483 U.S. 868 (1997).
114. Id. at 874.
115. Id. at 875. Parolees enjoy less protection because “parole is more akin to
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850
(2006). For a more thorough discussion of the constitutional rights of individuals on
probation, parole, and supervised release, see Wynton, supra note 11, at 1878–81.
116. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
117. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (“On this continuum, parolees have fewer expectations
of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is
to imprisonment.”).
118. Wynton, supra note 11, at 1882.
119. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that prisoners are entitled to
First Amendment protection but that a “regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests”).
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is released from the control of the criminal justice system, there are no longer any
penological or supervisory reasons for limiting their First Amendment rights.120
Although it is likely true that felons enjoy some of the Constitution’s
protections, the Supreme Court has permitted certain constitutional rights of felons
to be abridged, such as the right to vote.121 Nevertheless, there are good reasons
why felons should enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment. The framers of
the First Amendment did not include any limiting language that would indicate any
intent to deny felons the protections granted by the amendment.122 Further, society
benefits from additional ideas competing in the marketplace of ideas,123 regardless
of where the idea originated. The Supreme Court has recognized that “the public
[has] the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are
worthy of consideration.”124 Denying felons the protections of the First
Amendment would deny the public of the aforementioned right and privilege.
The lower federal courts that have examined the First Amendment rights of
felons have found that these individuals are protected by the amendment’s
breadth.125 All four of the federal courts that have examined sex offender social
media bans have either impliedly or explicitly assumed that the individuals covered
by the statutes were entitled to full First Amendment protection. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found that Indiana’s social media ban “clearly
implicate[d] [sex offenders’] First Amendment rights.”126 The court in Doe v.

120. Wynton, supra note 11, at 1881–82.
121. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). It bears pointing out that Richardson rests
on relatively narrow grounds. Wynton, supra note 11, at 1881 n.109 (“[T]he Supreme Court
has upheld laws disenfranchising felons based upon the express language of ‘participation in
rebellion, or other crime’ in the Appointment Clause in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and because it was historically viewed as valid to disenfranchise criminals with
felony convictions, not because felons have limited constitutional rights in general.”).
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
123. For a discussion and criticism of the theory of the marketplace of ideas, see Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–16.
124. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (emphasis added).
125. See Doe v. Shurtleff, No. 1:08-CV-64 TC, 2008 WL 4427594, at *6 (D. Utah Sept. 25,
2008) (“A review of various federal cases leads the court to conclude [that] Mr. Doe has not
given up his right to anonymous internet speech because of his status as a sex offender.”),
vacated as moot, 2009 WL 2601458 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2009); Doe v. Marion Cnty., 566 F.
Supp. 2d 862, 879 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (“[Those who] are no longer under any court supervision. . .
. are entitled to full Fourth Amendment protection . . . .”). The same analysis also applies to
other constitutional rights. See, e.g., Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 902 (D. Neb. 2010)
(“[The government has] cited no case where a ‘sex offender’ who has completed his or her
punishment and supervision for a sex crime was held to have a weaker claim to Fourth
Amendment protection than ordinary citizens. Without precedent (or at least an analogous and
well-reasoned case), I am unwilling to vitiate the Fourth Amendment for individuals who have
paid their debt to society.”).
126. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court in Doe v.
Marion County, which was reversed by the aforementioned Seventh Circuit decision, did not
even consider that the individual challenging the statute might have diminished First
Amendment rights simply because he was a convicted sex offender. See Doe v. Marion Cnty.,
No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 2376141, at *5–10 (S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012), rev’d,
705 F.3d 694.
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Nebraska127 explained that “[p]eople who are convicted of crimes, even felony
crimes related to children, do not forfeit their First Amendment right to speak by
accessing the Internet.”128 In Doe v. Jindal129—a case examining the
constitutionality of Louisiana’s initial ban130 of sex offenders from social media—
the district court made no reference to the possibility that convicted sex offenders
might have diminished First Amendment rights and examined the statute as it
would any other restriction on speech rights.131
It is also evident that social media should receive full First Amendment
protection.132 As discussed earlier, a significant amount of political discourse takes
place via social media,133 and the Supreme Court considers political speech to be
the “core” of the First Amendment.134 Beyond core political speech, social media
allows users to take part in other activities that have been traditionally thought to be
within the purview of the First Amendment.135 One commentator has even made
the argument that the First Amendment protects activities that are only possible
through social media, such as clicking Facebook’s “like” button—which allows a
user to express their appreciation for a particular piece of shared content.136
For all of the previously discussed reasons, sex offenders’ and other felons’ right
to access social media is fully protected by the First Amendment and should
continue to be for the foreseeable future.
B. Proper Analytical Framework
The scholarly community has made several different suggestions for the proper
analytical framework through which to examine social media bans. One
commentator has argued that social media bans violate a sex offender’s expressive
association rights,137 and other commentators have argued that social media bans
violate a sex offender’s right to freedom of expression.138 Among those who argue

127. The opinion referenced here is a memorandum and order issued after a summary
judgment motion. This order demanded a trial on the issue of the constitutionality of
Nebraska’s sex offender social media ban. Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 892, 911.
128. Id. at 911 (citing United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005)).
129. 853 F. Supp. 2d 596 (M.D. La. 2012).
130. Louisiana has redrafted their social media ban after this decision was issued. See Act
of May 22, 2012, No. 205, § 14:91.5, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 205 (H.B. 620) (West).
131. See Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 603–07.
132. For a discussion of lower court cases that have held that activity on Facebook is
protected speech, see Leigh Ellen Gray, Note, Thumb War: The Facebook “Like” Button
and Free Speech in the Era of Social Networking, 7 Charleston L. Rev. 447, 478–80 (2013).
133. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995); see also
supra note 37.
135. See supra note 37.
136. Gray, supra note 132, at 483–87.
137. Wynton, supra note 11, at 1901–02.
138. Douglas B. McKechnie, Facebook Is Off-Limits? Criminalizing Bidrectional
Communication via the Internet Is Prior Restraint 2.0, 46 IND. L. REV. 643, 663–69 (2013);
Eva Conner, Comment, Why Don’t You Take a Seat Away from that Computer?: Why
Louisiana Revised Statute 14:91.4 Is Unconstitutional, 73 LA. L. REV. 883, 904–09 (2013).
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that social media bans create a freedom of expression problem, one commentator,
Professor McKechnie, has argued that social media bans should be viewed as a
prior restraint,139 and one commentator has argued that social media bans should be
viewed as content-neutral restrictions on speech.140 This subpart will first examine
whether social media bans should be analyzed through the Supreme Court’s
freedom of expression or freedom of expressive association jurisprudence. After
arguing that social media bans should be viewed as creating a freedom of
expression issue, this subpart will examine whether social media bans should be
examined as prior restraints or as content-neutral restrictions on speech and will
argue that social media bans should be viewed as content-neutral restrictions on
speech.
1. Social Media Ban Statutes Impinge on Sex Offenders’ Freedom of Expression
It is undeniable that social media bans impinge on both the free speech rights
and the expressive associational rights of the individuals that they apply to;
however, examining the issue from a freedom of speech perspective seems to be
more appropriate for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court has more thoroughly
developed the contours of free speech jurisprudence, as compared to freedom of
association jurisprudence, and these contours have withstood the test of time.
Second, the freedom of expression is better suited to examine social media statutes
because social media ban statutes implicate the First Amendment rights of
individuals, not groups. Third, the Internet’s usefulness in distributing protected
speech is already well established by Supreme Court precedent, unlike the
Internet’s usefulness for enhancing expressive association.
As one commentator has put it, “[T]he Supreme Court’s categories of expressive
and intimate association . . . are neither well-settled nor defensible.”141 The current
freedom of expressive association doctrine evolved from a 1984 decision;142 the
bedrock cases in the Supreme Court’s freedom of expression jurisprudence
emerged much earlier.143 The fact that the Supreme Court’s freedom of expression
jurisprudence has had more time to develop shows that the doctrines established
within the freedom of expression framework have withstood the test of time.
Further, freedom of expression doctrines have become more clearly defined, which
allows lower federal courts and state courts to reach a particular result with more
confidence. If a doctrine has a lot of gray area, lower courts should attempt to avoid
the gray area and rest their rulings on more secure jurisprudential footing in order
to maintain consistency.

139. McKechnie, supra note 138, at 663–69.
140. The commentator actually describes social media ban statutes as time, place, and
manner restrictions. Conner, supra note 138, at 904–09. This Note uses the term contentneutral restriction, but the terms can be thought of as one in the same. See McKechnie, supra
note 138, at 659.
141. John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43
CONN. L. REV. 149, 149 (2010).
142. Id.
143. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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As the Supreme Court has put it, “Government actions that may
unconstitutionally infringe upon th[e] freedom [of expressive association] can take
a number of forms.”144 These forms include the withholding of benefits or the
imposition of penalties on members of a disfavored group,145 the prohibition of
anonymous membership in a group seeking anonymity,146 and the interference with
the “internal organization or affairs of [a] group.”147 Groups are protected by
expressive association because “[a]ccording protection to collective effort on behalf
of shared goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity
and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.”148 In sum,
the expressive associational doctrine is currently geared toward ensuring that
members of groups are protected from oppressive government intrusion,149 not
toward ensuring an individual’s ability to communicate and interact with groups
and other individuals.
It is true that social media bans will have an incidental effect on the expressive
associational rights of some individual sex offenders, but individual sex offenders
are not the type of group acting towards a shared goal discussed in the Supreme
Court’s precedents.150 In fact, individual sex offenders likely have a variety of
different groups and political causes that they would like to use social media to
connect with, but no single formalized group is likely to be substantially affected
by social media ban statutes. Ultimately, social media bans implicate an
individual’s right to freedom of expression, not a group’s right to expressive
association.
Even commentary in support of expressive association acknowledges that “the
Supreme Court has recognized the Internet’s important role in facilitating the
dissemination of protected speech, [but] it has not acknowledged the Internet’s role
in facilitating expressive association to the same extent.”151 At least some of the
services that sex offenders are denied access to by social media ban statutes are
purely expressive and are not especially useful for group associations. As an
example, instant messaging services, which are included in many social media
bans,152 only facilitate one-to-one communication, not group associational activity.
Banning access to instant messaging services clearly implicates an individual’s

144. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
145. Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–84 (1972)).
146. Id. at 622–23 (citing Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S.
87, 91–92 (1982)).
147. Id. at 623 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487–88 (1975)).
148. Id. at 622.
149. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“To determine whether a
group is protected by the First Amendment’s expressive associational right, we must
determine whether the group engages in ‘expressive association.’” (emphasis added)); U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622–29 (holding that the expressive associational right applied to the
U.S. Jaycees’ exclusion of certain members, but holding “that Minnesota’s compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justifie[d] the impact . . . on
the male members’ associational freedoms”).
150. See U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622.
151. Wynton, supra note 11, at 1872 (internal footnote omitted).
152. See supra Part II.
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right to freedom of expression. Because freedom of expression is implicated in
some way by all of the services that social media ban statutes touch, it is both
practical and appropriate to use the Supreme Court’s freedom of expression
jurisprudence to analyze the constitutionality of social media bans.
2. Social Media Ban Statutes Are Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech
Social media bans are best viewed as content-neutral restrictions153 on the
freedom of expression instead of prior restraints for two reasons. First, social media
ban statutes do not actually stop communication before it occurs. Second, social
media bans are distinct from judicial prior restraints because an individual subject
to a social media ban is permitted to communicate using social media and then
challenge the constitutionality of the restriction at their criminal trial.
Professor McKechnie asserts that “social [media ban] statutes aim to stop
communication before it occurs.”154 This is simply not true. Social media ban
statutes aim to stop communication through a particular channel—social media—
before the communication occurs. Sex offenders subject to social media bans are
permitted to use offline forms of communication and forms of Internet
communication that are not banned by the statute—which, depending on the social
media ban statute, may be an extremely limited portion of the Internet—to convey
whatever communication they wish.155 Professor McKechnie seems to suggest that
there is communication that can only occur through social media channels,156 a
point that this Note is in concurrency with.157 This point seems to give more weight
to the theory that social media bans stop communication before it occurs because, if
social media ban statutes ban an individual from utilizing all channels of
communication that are suitable for a particular type of communication, then that
individual is effectively banned from making that type of communication; however,
the content-neutral doctrine already prevents individuals from being banned from
channels that are necessary to make certain communications. The content-neutral
doctrine examines whether a particular restriction leaves open ample alternative
channels of communication158 and is, therefore, well-suited to ensure that such
restrictions are found unconstitutional.
Individuals who are subject to social media ban statutes are free to violate these
statutes and then challenge the constitutionality of the restrictions during their
criminal trials. This has already occurred at least twice, once in Indiana and once in
North Carolina.159 In both cases, an individual that was subject to a social media

153. This class of restrictions is also referred to as time, place, and manner restrictions.
See McKechnie, supra note 138, at 659–60 (explaining that a time, place, and manner
restriction is a form of content-neutral restriction that is acceptable under the First
Amendment).
154. McKechnie, supra note 138, at 666–67.
155. See supra Part II.
156. See McKechnie, supra note 138, at 666.
157. See infra Part III.C.2.
158. See infra Part III.C.2.
159. See Harris v. State, 985 N.E.2d 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Packingham, 748
S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
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ban violated the ban and then successfully avoided criminal punishment by
challenging the constitutionality of the social media ban at trial and on appeal.160
This facet of social media ban statutes is very different from judicial injunctions,
which are commonly viewed as prior restraints.161 The “collateral bar rule”
demands that “persons subject to an injunctive order . . . obey th[e] decree until it is
modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order.”162
One criticism that has been levied against viewing social media bans as
content-neutral restrictions on speech is that social media bans “do not aim to
balance the speakers’ rights with the orderly and convenient use of the community
environs,” which, according to Professor McKechnie, is the goal of a typical
content-neutral restriction.163 The drafters of social media ban statutes would likely
disagree that these statutes were not crafted, in some sense, to allow for “the
orderly and convenient use” of social media. It is clear that the key state interest at
stake in drafting social media bans was to ensure the safety of children using social
media.164 It is difficult to imagine how children could use social media in an
“orderly and convenient” fashion if their safety was in jeopardy.
Professor McKechnie goes on to assert that content-neutral restrictions “are not
created because of, or formulated to deal with, the inherent dangerousness—
perceived or otherwise—of a speaker, the content of his or her message, or the
message’s effect on the listener.”165 This point is simply untrue. The Supreme
Court has endorsed content-neutral restrictions on speech that are directed to
preventing lawless conduct on behalf of a particular group. In Madsen v. Women’s
Health Center, Inc.,166 the Supreme Court partially upheld an injunction that
imposed restrictions on the activities of antiabortion protestors that had illegally
disrupted the activities of an abortion clinic.167 Professor McKechnie seeks to
distinguish Madsen by pointing out that the injunction was tailored in response to
the illegal conduct of a particular group of protestors and not a blanket ban on the
activities of a particular group, like social media bans.168 What Professor
McKechnie points out is true, but this is not a criticism of using the content-neutral
doctrine as a framework for examining the constitutionality of social media bans;
rather, this point simply demonstrates that social media bans are unconstitutional
within the content-neutral framework.169 Rather than demonstrating that “the
[content-neutral] doctrine is unworkable, and thus ill-suited to determine the . . .
constitutionality [of social media bans],”170 Professor McKechnie merely makes an

160. Harris, 985 N.E.2d at 781; Packingham, 748 S.E.2d at 149–50, 154.
161. See McKechnie, supra note 138, at 664.
162. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980).
163. McKechnie, supra note 138, at 660.
164. See, e.g., Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The state
initially asserts an interest in ‘protecting public safety, and specifically in protecting minors
from harmful online communications.’”).
165. McKechnie, supra note 138, at 660.
166. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
167. Id. at 776.
168. See McKechnie, supra note 138, at 661–62.
169. A position consistent with the position of this Note. See infra Part III.C.
170. McKechnie, supra note 138, at 662.

2014]

REMOVING DISFAVORED FACES FROM FACEBOOK

1349

effective argument that social media bans are impermissible content-neutral
restrictions.
It bears pointing out that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and all three
federal district courts that have examined the constitutionality of social media bans
have done so through the freedom of expression and the content-neutral doctrine.171
No litigant has argued that social media bans should be treated as a prior restraint,
but several litigants have attempted to argue that social media bans violate their
right to freedom of association. The Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Marion County
makes no reference to the freedom of association in its opinion and rests its holding
exclusively on the freedom of expression.172 This is despite the fact that the district
court mentions that the plaintiff challenged the statute on both freedom of speech
and freedom of association grounds, and even concluded that “[i]t appears wellsettled that [both the freedom of speech and freedom of association] are secured by
the First Amendment.”173 However, even after noting this, the district court does
not mention the freedom of association again in its analysis.174 In Doe v. Nebraska,
the district court recognized that associational rights are hindered by the social
media ban in question;175 however, the court—like the Indiana district court—
simply examined the statute through the freedom of speech doctrine.176 The district
court that examined Louisiana’s social media ban in Doe v. Jindal made no
mention of the freedom of association whatsoever.177
C. Social Media Bans are Impermissible Content-Neutral Restrictions
The social media bans initially passed by Indiana, Louisiana, and Nebraska are
all “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”178 This

171. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. Two state courts that have examined the
constitutionality of social media bans have also looked at the issue as a content-neutral
freedom of expression problem. Harris v. State, 985 N.E.2d 767, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013);
State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146, 150 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
172. See Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d 694, 697–703 (7th Cir. 2013).
173. Doe v. Marion Cnty., No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 2376141, at *5
(S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012), rev’d, 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013).
174. See id. at *5–10.
175. Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1119 (D. Neb. 2012) (“[I]t is clear that the
language is properly interpreted to ‘criminalize[] a substantial amount of protected expressive
activity,’—from associating with friends, family, and business associates over the Internet (the
most common method of association in the modern age) to communicating with consumers,
customers, or manufacturers regarding a commercial product or service, to posting and
discussing one’s political opinions on an interactive blog or news web site.” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297) (2008))).
176. See id. at 1119–23.
177. See Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 599–607 (M.D. La. 2012). It is not clear,
from the opinion or the filings that are available, if this is due to the freedom of association
not being raised as an issue by the plaintiffs. The court only explained that “[p]laintiffs
allege[d] that [Louisiana’s social media ban was] facially overbroad and unconstitutional in
that it significantly infringe[d] on their First Amendment rights.” Id. at 600.
178. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
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attribute makes these social media bans content-neutral speech restrictions.179
Every court that has examined a social media ban statute has determined that social
media ban statutes are content neutral.180
Content-neutral speech restrictions are examined under a lower level of scrutiny
than content-based restrictions.181 Content-neutral restrictions will be upheld if
“they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and . . .
they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.”182 Two of the federal district courts that have examined social media
bans have found that they failed this test (Louisiana and Nebraska), while one came
to the opposite conclusion (Indiana).183 However, the district court that found that
Indiana’s social media ban was constitutional was later overruled by the Seventh
Circuit, which determined that Indiana’s social media ban did not survive First
Amendment scrutiny.184 This Part will examine the analysis conducted by the
Seventh Circuit and the three district courts that have examined social media bans

179. Id.
180. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The Indiana law . . . is
content neutral because it restricts speech without reference to the expression’s content.”);
Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 n.7 (“[Nebraska’s social media ban] should be
deemed content-neutral for purposes of First Amendment analysis.”); Doe v. Marion Cnty.,
No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 2376141, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012) (“Mr.
Doe concedes that the statute is ‘content neutral’. . . .”), rev’d, 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013).
The district court in Doe v. Jindal never expressly stated that Louisiana’s social media ban
was content neutral. See Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 603–05. However, the district
court analyzed the statute as if it were a content-neutral restriction. The court explained that
the state’s interest in protecting children is legitimate but the statute was not “narrowly
drawn.” Id. at 605 (quoting Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1113 (5th Cir. 1986) (en
banc)). The narrow tailoring requirement is part of the test for content-neutral restrictions.
See infra Part III.C.1. If the district court believed that this was a content-based restriction,
the court would have applied heightened scrutiny because “[c]ontent-based regulations are
presumptively invalid.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). Further, the
Fifth Circuit case that was cited in the analysis by the district court in Doe v. Jindal
examined the constitutionality of a content-neutral restriction. See Hill, 789 F.2d at 1119
(“The restriction is content-neutral . . . .”); Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
181. “For First Amendment purposes, content-neutral regulations do not pose the same
inherent dangers to free expression that content-based regulations do; thus, they are subject
to a less rigorous analysis, which affords the government latitude in designing regulatory
solutions.” 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 478 (2009) (citing Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380 (9th Cir. 1996); Able
v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996)).
182. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). Rock Against Racism dealt with a time, place, and
manner restriction in a public forum. Id. These types of restrictions create a slightly different
constitutional issue because instead of regulating public property (as is the case in public
forum cases), the state is regulating who can use private property that is open to the public.
Because none of the federal cases examining these statutes factors in public forum doctrine
in their analysis, this Note will assume that this wrinkle does not change the analysis.
183. Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1086–1132; Doe v. Marion Cnty., 2012 WL
2376141, at *1–11; Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 596–607.
184. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d at 695.
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and argue that the Seventh Circuit, the Louisiana district court, and the Nebraska
district court—finding that social media bans violate the First Amendment rights of
sex offenders—were largely correct in their analysis.
1. Social Media Bans Fail the Narrow Tailoring Requirement
The Supreme Court has made it clear that “[a] statute is narrowly tailored if it
targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to
remedy. A complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if each activity within
the proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted evil.”185 Narrow tailoring can
only be judged in relation to the interest that the state is attempting to serve. In the
context of social media bans, the state interest at play is protecting children—an
undoubtedly compelling interest.186 This leaves the question: are social media bans
targeted to “eliminate[] no more than the exact source of”187 harm that is caused to
minors by convicted sex offenders using social media? These bans are not narrowly
tailored because (1) the conduct they seek to proscribe is already illegal, (2) they
apply to more offenders than necessary, and (3) the definitions they use to describe
the forbidden websites and utilities are too expansive.
The Seventh Circuit determined in Doe v. Marion County that Indiana’s social
media ban did not satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement.188 The court pointed out
that “illicit communication comprises a minuscule subset of the universe of social
network activity.”189 However, what seemed to be of greater concern for the court
was the fact that “Indiana ha[d] other methods to combat unwanted and
inappropriate communication between minors and sex offenders.”190 The Seventh
Circuit was referring to the fact that the conduct Indiana was seeking to prevent—
solicitation of a minor by a sex offender through social media—was already a
crime in Indiana, and the statutes criminalizing child solicitation accomplish the
state’s “end more narrowly (by refusing to burden benign Internet activity).”191
This is true not only in Indiana, but in Louisiana and Nebraska as well.192 Further,
the penalties imposed by Indiana, Louisiana, and Nebraska for accessing a social
media website are lower than for soliciting a minor using electronic

185. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (citation omitted) (citing Members of
the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808–10 (1984)). The Seventh
Circuit viewed Indiana’s social media ban as a type of complete ban that the Supreme Court
was referencing in Frisby. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d at 698 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at
485). For a detailed analysis of the Supreme Court’s content-neutral jurisprudence, see id. at
698–99.
186. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“We have
recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of minors.”).
187. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485.
188. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d at 698 (“[W]e conclude [Indiana’s social media ban]
is not narrowly tailored . . . .”).
189. Id. at 699.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-6 (Supp. 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.3 (Supp. 2013);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-320.02 (LexisNexis 2009).
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communication.193 The social media bans implemented by these states are,
therefore, unlikely to stop illegitimate conduct—because sex offenders who are not
deterred by the punishment for solicitation will likely not be deterred by the lesser
punishment imposed by the social media ban.194 The only likely effect of social
media bans is to chill legitimate expressive conduct.195

193. Compare IND. CODE § 35-42-4-6 (2008) (“[An offender who] commits child
solicitation . . . [has committed] a Class D felony. However, the offense is a Class C felony if
it is committed by using a computer network . . . and a Class B felony if the person commits
the offense by using a computer network . . . and has a previous unrelated conviction for
committing the offense by using a computer network . . . .”), amended by Act of May 11,
2013, Pub. L. No. 247-2013, sec. 7, § 6, 2013 Ind. Acts 3384, 3397, and LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:81.3 (imposing varying levels of punishment ranging from a fine of “not more
than ten thousand dollars and [imprisonment] at hard labor for not less than five years nor
more than ten years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence” to
imprisonment “for not less than ten years nor more than twenty years at hard labor without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence” depending on the age difference
between the victim and offender and other factors), and NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28-320.02(2) (“A person who violates this section is guilty of a Class ID felony. If a person
who violates this section has previously been convicted of a violation of this section [or
certain other sex offenses] . . . the person is guilty of a Class IC felony.”), with IND. CODE
§ 35-42-4-12 (2008) (“A person [banned from social media that accesses one of the banned
sites or utilities] commits a sex offender Internet offense, a Class A misdemeanor. However,
the offense is a Class D felony if the person has a prior unrelated conviction under this
section.”), amended by Act of May 11, 2013, Pub. L. No. 247-2013, sec. 8, § 12, 2013
Ind. Acts 3384, 3398, and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5(D) (2012) (“Whoever commits the
crime of unlawful use or access of social media shall, upon a first conviction, be fined not
more than ten thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned with hard labor for not more than ten
years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. . . . Whoever commits
the crime . . . upon a second or subsequent conviction, shall be fined not more than twenty
thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned with hard labor for not less than five years nor
more than twenty years without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.”),
amended by Act of May 22, 2012, No. 205, § 14:91.5, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 205
(H.B. 620) (West), and NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-322.05 (LexisNexis 2009) (“Unlawful
use of the Internet by a prohibited sex offender is a Class I misdemeanor for a first offense.
Any second or subsequent conviction under this section is a Class IIIA felony.”).
194. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d at 701 (“[I]f [sex offenders] are willing to break the
existing antisolicitation law, why would the social networking law provide any more
deterrence? By breaking two laws, the sex offender will face increased sentences; however, the
state can avoid First Amendment pitfalls by just increasing the sentences for solicitation . . . .”).
195. The district court in Doe v. Marion County also addressed this argument in its
opinion and found that the “argument has some appeal, but the Court [wa]s not persuaded.”
Doe v. Marion Cnty., No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-JD, 2012 WL 2376141, at *8 (S.D. Ind. June
22, 2012), rev’d, 705 F.3d 694. The court made a distinction between the two statutes
because one set “aims to punish those who have already committed the crime of solicitation.
[Indiana’s social media ban] . . . aims to prevent and deter the sexual exploitation of minors
by barring certain sexual offenders from entering a virtual world where they have access to
minors.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit was critical of this argument
because all laws are meant to serve a deterrence function through the punishment they apply,
and explained that “[t]he legislature attached criminal penalties to solicitations in order to
prevent conduct in the same way decade-long sentences are promulgated to deter repeat drug
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The district courts in Doe v. Jindal and Doe v. Nebraska found that Louisiana’s
and Nebraska’s social media bans, respectively, did not satisfy the narrow tailoring
requirement.196 In Doe v. Nebraska, the court pointed to a trait that all three of the
statutes had in common at the time they were analyzed—the bans do not “require a
showing that the offender poses a present threat to use [social media] to get at
children.”197 The court found that this meant “the statute is not narrowly tailored to
target those offenders who pose a factually based risk to children through the use or
threatened use of banned sites or services.”198
Not only did the statutes initially passed by Indiana, Louisiana, and Nebraska
fail to require a showing that a banned sex offender pose a present risk to children,
but the statutes also applied to sex offenders that did not use a social network—or
even a computer—in committing their offense.199 The court in Doe v. Nebraska
recognized that this created a narrow tailoring issue.200 In all of the federal cases
examining the constitutionality of sex offender social media ban, no court’s opinion
mentioned any factual data brought forward by the state indicating that sex
offenders as a class are likely to use social media to exploit children.201 Without
some data supporting the proposition, it strains credulity to believe that sex
offenders that committed crimes that did not involve social media or a computer
would pose a serious threat to use social media to commit crimes against children
in the future.202
offenses.” Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d at 701. However, the district court’s distinction is
flawed further: it assumes that individuals who are banned by the statute are unable to
control themselves if they are exposed to children online. If this is true, these individuals are
likely just as dangerous in public as they are on the Internet and should not be allowed to be
out of prison or off probation, parole, or supervised release. One might argue that social
media poses a greater danger than allowing these individuals to be relatively free in public
because of the anonymity offered by the Internet. However, federal regulations already
require that sex offenders disclose “all designations used by sex offenders for purposes of
routing or self-identification in Internet communications or postings.” National Guidelines
for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38030, 38055 (July 2, 2008).
Sex offenders have no more privacy online than they do in public.
196. Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1109 (D. Neb. 2012) (“After very careful
deliberation, I decide that [Nebraska’s social media ban] is not narrowly tailored.”); Doe v.
Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 (M.D. La. 2012) (“In its current form, [Louisiana’s social
media ban] is not crafted precisely or narrowly enough—as is required by constitutional
standards—to limit the conduct it seeks to proscribe.”).
197. Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1111; see IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-322.05.
198. Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
199. See supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text (detailing the crimes to which
Indiana’s social media ban applied); supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text (detailing the
crimes to which Louisiana’s social media ban applied); supra notes 92–100 and
accompanying text (detailing the crimes to which Nebraska’s social media ban applied).
200. See Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
201. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp.
2d at 1086–132; Doe v. Marion Cnty., No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 2376141
(S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012), rev’d, 705 F.3d 694; Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 596–607.
202. It is obviously possible that a particular sex offender that commits a crime without
using social media or a computer may be likely to use social media to commit additional
crimes against children in the future, but it is difficult to believe that all sex offenders that
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The social media ban statutes passed by Indiana, Louisiana, and Nebraska all
posed an additional narrowing tailoring problem in the scope of utilities and
websites to which they applied. The court in Doe v. Nebraska seized on the fact
that Nebraska’s social media ban used definitions that included more utilities and
websites than necessary to achieve the state’s goal. One particularly problematic
definition for the court was the statute’s definition of instant messaging services,
which the court feared would include text messaging with a cellular phone.203 Even
if cellular phone text messaging was not included within Nebraska’s definition, it
was and is possible to use many online instant messaging services to send and
receive text messages, without using their other functions.204 The court explained
that banning offenders from text messaging would be an “insurmountable burden”
for the statute to overcome, because of the astounding number of text messages
sent per day in the United States.205
The court in Doe v. Jindal recognized that Louisiana’s initial attempt at a social
media ban did not meet the narrow tailoring requirement because of the substantial
number of websites that it applied to. The court did not provide much analysis on
the narrow tailoring element in its opinion;206 however, the court did indicate that
commit a particular crime that does not involve social media or a computer are likely to use
social media to commit offenses against children using social media in the future.
203. Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1113–19.
204. Id. at 1113 (“‘[T]ext messages’ can be sent and received by instant messaging
services such as Google Talk, Windows Live Messenger, and Yahoo Messenger.”).
205. According to a source cited by the court, 2.5 billion text messages are sent per day.
Id. at 1113 n.22. The court’s logic may be a bit off on this point, although the court seems to
have reached the correct conclusion. The number of text messages sent per day is not in and
of itself evidence of a lack of narrow tailoring. The fact that text messaging is a very popular
form of communication does not directly lead to the conclusion that it is a medium of
communication that cannot be used to harm minors (otherwise the statute might correctly
apply to text messages). However, if text messaging was included in the statute’s ban, this
might be evidence of a lack of narrow tailoring for another reason. These statutes seem to be
primarily concerned with preventing sex offenders from preying on children they do not
already know (otherwise these statutes would accomplish very little; if the offender already
knows the potential victim, banning them from social media would probably not prevent the
potential harm), and therefore a narrowly tailored statute would ban sex offenders only from
mediums of communication that are effective at facilitating introduction, like chat rooms and
social networks. Text messaging is not an effective means of introduction, as you must have
someone’s phone number in order to send that person a text message.
206. The Indiana district court was critical of the analysis in Doe v. Jindal. The Indiana
district court claimed that Jindal did not use the content-neutral framework in its analysis
and that the court in Jindal “relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Stevens.” Doe v. Marion Cnty., No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 2376141, at *11
(S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012), rev’d, 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013). The Indiana district court was
critical of the Jindal court’s use of Stevens because—as the court correctly pointed out—the
Supreme Court in Stevens was examining a content-based restriction. Id.; see United States
v. Stevens 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). The first point is simply incorrect; although the
court in Jindal did not expressly state that the statute was content neutral, the court applied a
content-neutral framework. See supra note 180. The Indiana district court even quoted the
portion of the Jindal opinion that articulated the narrow tailoring test. See Doe v. Marion
Cnty., 2012 WL 2376141, at *10. The second criticism is also misplaced; the Jindal court
relied on the Stevens opinion, but it did so only for the Court’s articulation of the
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the constitutional problem created by the statute was partially due to the breadth of
the ban. Specifically, the court found that the ban applied to “many commonly read
news and information websites, . . . social networking websites[, and] . . . . the
website for [the Louisiana district court].”207
The district court208 in Doe v. Marion County “readily acknowledge[d] that
[Indiana’s social media ban] captures considerable conduct that has nothing to do
with interacting with minors.”209 In spite of this acknowledgement, the district
court concluded that “Indiana’s statute is not ‘substantially broader than necessary’
to achieve its goals of prevention and deterrence.”210 In reaching this conclusion,
the court mentioned an additional state interest that is at play in the consideration of
social media bans: keeping sexual predators out of situations that might lead to
them reoffending.211 Compared to the interest in protecting children, this interest is
not clearly a “substantial interest.” However, assuming arguendo that this is a
substantial state interest, the interest does not justify preventing sex offenders from
participating in legitimate activities that are difficult, if not impossible, to
participate in without the help of social networks, such as communicating with
people about politics on a national stage, communicating with large groups of
people with similar interests, and easily keeping up with friends and family
scattered across the United States and the rest of the world.212
These bans are meant to protect children; therefore, they should only ban sex
offenders from social media utilities and websites that children can and do
access.213 Indiana and Nebraska both attempted to limit their social media bans to
websites that allow access by children under the age of eighteen.214 The problem

overbreadth test in Stevens. See Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 604. The overbreadth
doctrine is applicable to content-neutral restrictions. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 683 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The must-carry provisions are fatally
overbroad, even under a content-neutral analysis . . . .”). Even the Indiana district court was
willing to apply the overbreadth doctrine, but the court ultimately concluded that it was “not
needed.” Doe v. Marion Cnty., 2012 WL 2376141, at *6. Therefore, the Jindal court was
correct to rely on Stevens.
207. Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
208. The district court opinion in Doe v. Marion County is analyzed here to provide
counterarguments. Even though the court’s decision was ultimately overruled by the Seventh
Circuit, other courts remain unbound by the Seventh Circuit’s opinion and may seize on the
district court’s reasoning.
209. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 2012 WL 2376141, at *7.
210. Id. at *8.
211. Id. (“It stands to reason that many sex offenders might sign up for social networking
with pure intentions, only to succumb to their inner demons when given the opportunity to
interact with potential victims.”).
212. See supra Part I. The court also does not address the fact that the ban applies to
more people than necessary. Indiana’s social media ban does not require that the sex offense
that triggers the statutes applicability involve a computer, a social network, or even a child.
See Doe v. Marion Cnty., 2012 WL 2376141, at *6–9; supra Part II.A.
213. This limitation is likely meaningless when it comes to instant messaging and chat
room services because, as one expert observed in Doe v. Nebraska, there are very few if any
instant messaging and chat room services that attempt to limit access by minors. Doe v.
Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1116 (D. Neb. 2012).
214. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12(e) (2008), amended by Act of May 11, 2013, Pub. L. No.
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lies in defining what websites and utilities allow access to minors and how much
access can be allowed.215 Websites that—by their own terms of service—do not
allow access by individuals under a certain age can and are accessed by children
under the specified age limit.216 The district court in Doe v. Marion County
sidestepped this problem by interpreting the statute to apply only when a website’s
terms of service allow access.217 However, the court in Doe v. Nebraska criticized
this interpretation and noted an important problem with such an interpretation: it
imposes a de facto duty on individuals who are limited by the statute to constantly
monitor the terms of service of the social media they use to ensure that the websites
do not change the terms in order to allow access by minors.218
2. Social Media Bans Leave a Lack of Adequate
Alternative Channels of Communication
As pointed out by the district court in Doe v. Nebraska, “one is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that
it may be exercised in some other place.”219 But, the district court in Doe v. Marion
County relied on Seventh Circuit precedent to point out that “[a]n adequate
alternative does not have to be the speaker’s first or best choice . . . or one that
provides the same audience or impact for the speech.”220 However, as the court in
Doe v. Nebraska aptly stated, “The Supreme Court uses the word ‘ample’ not as an
afterthought, but as a real safeguard.”221 Social media bans do not leave open ample
alternative channels of communication because so much speech is now either

247-2013, sec. 7, § 6, 2013 Ind. Acts 3384, 3397; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-322.05(1)
(LexisNexis 2009). Louisiana’s original statute did not exclude websites and utilities that
only allow access by individuals over the age of eighteen. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:91.5 (2012), amended by Act of May 22, 2012, No. 205, § 14:91.5, 2012 La. Sess. Law
Serv. Act 205 (H.B. 620) (West).
215. In other words, does a website allow minors access if a minor can visit the website
simply to read the terms of service and to view an age verification page?
216. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
217. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 2012 WL 2376141, at *8.
218. Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (“[T]he . . . proposed construction
imposes upon the offender the obligation to read and understand the vendor’s terms-of-use
policy each time the offender uses the site. Importantly, this construction also fails to
acknowledge that the ‘terms of use’ may be worded in such a way as to permit change
without notice.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
219. Id. at 1117 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)). The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals did not reach the question of adequate alternative channels of
communication with respect to Indiana’s social media ban because the court found the law
was not narrowly tailored and saw no need to analyze the law further. Doe v. Marion Cnty.,
705 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2013). As such, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Doe v. Marion
County will not be referenced in this Part, but because the district court determined Indiana’s
social media ban left open adequate alternative channels of communication, that opinion will
be referenced. See Doe v. Marion Cnty., 2012 WL 2376141, at *9–10.
220. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 2012 WL 2376141, at *9 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted in original) (quoting Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2000)).
221. Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (citing Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977)).
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exclusively carried out through social media or exclusively made possible by social
media.
Certain news and information can only be attained nearly instantaneously and
continuously through social media channels. One example, cited by the district
court in Nebraska, is information relating to fast-moving world events, such as the
“Arab Spring.”222 “Under Nebraska’s ban, . . . offender[s were] barred from
receiving this information from Twitter and Facebook—news that might not be
available from any other source—even though the hunger for that news poses no
threat to children.”223 The court also pointed to other forms of communication that
cannot be carried out without the aid of social media, such as video conferencing
with individuals—sick relatives and business associates are some examples—
spread across the country.224 Furthermore, political discussions and debates,
discussions among members of professional groups, and business advertising are
increasingly taking place exclusively through social media.225 An individual must
have access to social media in order to fully receive this information and fully
participate in these discussions.
The district court in Doe v. Marion County reached a different conclusion than
that of the court in Doe v. Nebraska. The district court in Doe v. Marion County
explained that adequate alternatives were available because those affected by the
statute still had numerous “old fashioned” methods of communication at their
disposal.226 However, the court mischaracterizes the problem. Yes, there are many
“old fashioned” forms of communications left open by social media bans;
unfortunately, many people have migrated away from these channels of
communication and have begun using social media as a substitute.227 If a state
banned the telephone, surely the telegraph would not be viewed as an adequate
alternative channel of communication, or as the court in Doe v. Nebraska put it,
“[T]his is a little like banning the use of the telephone and then arguing that First

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1118.
Id.
See supra Part I.B.
The methods include
the ability to congregate with others, attend civic meetings, call in to radio
shows, write letters to newspapers and magazines, post on message boards,
comment on online stories that do not require [social media], email . . . , publish
a blog, and use social networking sites that do not allow minors . . . .
Doe v. Marion Cnty., No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 2376141, at *10 (S.D. Ind.
June 22, 2012), rev’d, 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013).
227. See supra Part I. Even the Supreme Court has already recognized this shift. The
Court has examined that “the advent of electronic media and social-networking sites reduces
the importance of [newsletters, bulletin boards, e-mail, office space, and recruiting fairs (for
student organizations)].” Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2991 (2010);
see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“Today, 30-second television
ads may be the most effective way to convey a political message. Soon, however, it may be
that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web sites, will provide citizens
with significant information about political candidates and issues.” (citation omitted)).
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Amendment values are preserved because the user can (perhaps) resort to a
walkie-talkie.”228
IV. DRAFTING A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE SOCIAL MEDIA BAN
Although this Note argues that the three statutes that have been examined by the
federal judiciary were properly found unconstitutional, there is still plenty of
constitutional space for a state to effectively serve its interest in protecting children.
This Part will examine several social media bans that have been passed by state
legislatures but have not yet been examined by the judiciary. This Part will then
look to some alternatives to blanket social media bans that will be less burdensome
on the First Amendment rights of sex offenders.
A. Social Media Bans Not Yet Subject to Federal Constitutional Challenge
Louisiana and Indiana amended their social media bans after the states’ original
bans were found to be unconstitutional.229 Indiana adopted legislation that alters its
social media ban so that it only applies to individuals that are under the supervision
of the criminal justice system.230 Minnesota, New York, and Texas have all adopted
similar social media bans.231 Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this Note to
examine social media bans that are only applicable to individuals who are under the
supervision of the criminal justice system,232 and this Subpart will focus only on
bans that are similar to the social media bans discussed throughout this Note.

228. Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. To provide further illustration, the
Indiana district court explains that individuals affected by social media bans “could create or
participate in a LISTSERV (a computer program that allows people to create, manage, and
control electronic mailing lists) in order to communicate with fellow pilots or persons who
have other similar interests.” Doe v. Marion Cnty., 2012 WL 2376141, at *7. This is true,
but the district court assumes that other pilots would be willing to participate in the
LISTSERV. Social networks provide instant access to a much broader audience than can be
reached easily by compiling a LISTSERV. See supra Part I.A. There is no incentive for other
pilots to participate in communications through a LISTERV with someone who is banned
from social networks; instead they are much more likely to simply communicate with pilot
groups on social networks where they can easily reach a much broader audience.
229. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (Supp. 2013); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12 (Supp.
2013).
230. IND. CODE § 11-10-11.5-11(b) (banning sex offenders from using social media if
they are part of a “community transition program”); id. § 35-38-2-2.7 (banning sex offenders
on probation or parole from using social media); id. § 35-42-4-12 (setting the punishment for
violating either of the previously mentioned statues as a “Class A misdemeanor” unless the
person has a “prior unrelated convicted under this section,” at which point “the offense is a
Class D felony”).
231. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.05(6)(c) (West Supp. 2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 65.10(4-a)(b) (McKinney 2013); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861 (West 2012).
232. For a discussion of some of the constitutional implications of social media bans that
do not apply to individuals outside the criminal justice system, see Wynton, supra note 11, at
1869–70, 1890–91.
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Louisiana’s new ban is similar to the state’s original ban,233 and as such,
Louisiana’s amended social media ban suffers from many of the problems that
plagued the state’s original ban. Louisiana eliminated its social media ban’s
prohibition on chat rooms and peer-to-peer networks; the ban now only applies to
social networks.234 Louisiana also significantly limited the definition of social
networks—which was originally one of the broadest definitions.235 Several other
states have also passed social media bans that have not yet been examined by the
federal judiciary; for instance, Kentucky and North Carolina have both passed
social media bans that are similar to Louisiana’s new ban.236
These newly passed social media bans suffer from many of the same problems
discussed in Part III.C.237 These social media bans still suffer from at least two
narrow tailoring problems: the applicability of the statutes are not limited to
offenders who use computers in committing their offense,238 and these states
already criminalize solicitation of minors though the use of a computer.239 The
latter of these narrow tailoring problems is likely constitutionally fatal. As pointed
out by the Seventh Circuit, antisolicitation statutes—like those of Louisiana,
Kentucky, and North Carolina—fulfill the state’s interest in protecting children
more narrowly than social media ban statutes by being “neither over- nor underinclusive.”240 If the statute were to survive the narrow tailoring element, the statute
would present an interesting constitutional problem. A court would need to
determine whether social networks present such a unique medium of
communication that a total ban on their use would not leave open adequate
alternative channels of communication.241 Because of the unique and ubiquitous

233. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:91.5 (2011).
234. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (Supp. 2013).
235. Id.; see supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
236. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.546 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-202.5 (West Supp. 2013), invalidated by State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2013). There are some major differences. Kentucky’s law applies broadly to anyone
that is required to register on Kentucky’s sex offender registry, which makes Kentucky’s law
applicable to the largest swath of sex offenders discussed in this Note. See KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17.500(5) (“‘Registrant’ means: (a) [a]ny person eighteen (18) years of age or older
at the time of the offense or any youthful offender . . . who has committed . . . [a] sex crime;
or . . . [a] criminal offense against a victim who is a minor; (b) or [a]ny person required to
register [under federal law or the laws of another state]; or (c) [a]ny sexually violent
predator; or (d) [a]ny person whose sexual offense has been diverted . . . , until the
diversionary period is successfully completed . . . .”). The Packingham court found that
North Carolina’s social media ban did not apply only to offenders that committed their
crimes against children, and as such, found that the statute “burdens more people than
necessary to achieve its purported goal.” 748 S.E.2d at 152.
237. See supra Part III.C.
238. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5. For an explanation of why this broad applicability
creates a constitutional problem, see supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
239. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.155; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.3; N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-202.3.
240. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2013); see also supra Part III.C.1.
241. It is possible to imagine a federal judge coming to this conclusion. See supra Part I
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nature of social media,242 social media bans should be viewed as failing to leave
open adequate alternative channels of communication. Ultimately, it seems unlikely
that blanket social media bans will survive constitutional scrutiny.243
B. Alternatives to Social Media Bans
States have numerous alternatives that help protect children using social media
without adopting blanket sex offender social media bans. Louisiana has passed
additional legislation that requires sex offenders who use social networks—who are
not banned from social networking websites by Louisiana’s social media ban—to
disclose their status as sex offenders on social networking websites and to indicate
“the crime for which [they were] convicted, the jurisdiction of conviction, a
description of [their] physical characteristics . . . and [their] residential address.”244
Compelled speech is not free of constitutional concerns;245 however, compelled
speech creates less of a First Amendment concern than completely foreclosing an
individual’s opportunity to use social media.246 At least one commentator believes

(discussing the importance of social media generally); supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the
“adequate alternatives channel of communication” prong of content-neutral analysis and the
implications of banning social media in relation to this prong); supra notes 226–28 and
accompanying text.
242. See supra Part I.
243. Contra Conner, supra note 138, at 883–85, 918–21 (arguing that Louisiana’s newly
adopted social media ban is “likely . . . constitutional under the [First Amendment’s
protection of] Free Speech” and proposing a redraft of Louisiana’s original social media ban
that would limit the number of websites to which the statute applied). The previously cited
scholarship does not address the arguments that no blanket social media ban can be narrowly
tailored to protecting children because antisolicitation statutes are the narrowly tailored
versions of social media bans and that blanket bans do not leave open adequate alternative
channels of communication. See id.; supra Part III.C.1–2.
244. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1(D).
245. “Just as the First Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting speech,
the Amendment may prevent the government from compelling individuals to express certain
views . . . .” United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001). Compelling sex
offenders to post their status as sex offenders when using social networks may be
particularly damaging due to the great—but arguably justifiable—stigma associated with sex
crimes in our society. Such disclosures may result in sex offenders being ostracized by other
users of social media, which would inhibit the usefulness of social media. This Note does not
seek to fully explore these constitutional concerns, but only seeks to argue that disclosures,
like those mandated by Louisiana, are less burdensome on sex offenders’ First Amendment
rights than blanket social media bans.
246. However, Justice Thomas would disagree with this proposition. Id. at 418–19
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately, however, to reiterate my views that . . .
compelling speech raises a First Amendment issue just as much as restricting speech.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Examining this issue in detail is beyond the scope of this
Note, but for a commentator’s sharp criticism of a California act that mandates disclosure of
sex offenders’ online usernames and identifying information, see Yonatan Moskowitz,
Legislative Note, Not in My Digital Backyard: Proposition 35 and California’s Sex Offender
Username Registry, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 571, 575–80 (2013).
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that these disclosures may be a viable alternative to social media bans.247 Forcing
such disclosures provides parents and guardians of children with an additional tool
to help ensure the safety of their children in the virtual and physical world.
Further, Louisiana’s disclosure rule will assist social networks that are
voluntarily attempting to remove sex offenders from their websites. The federal
government is also working to assist social networking websites that are attempting
to exclude sex offenders by creating a service that allows social networking
websites to compare their users’ names against the National Sex Offender
Registry.248 Because social networking websites are likely to receive a positive
public reaction for an effort to cleanse their services of sex offenders, many popular
social networking websites are likely to utilize a government service that facilitates
the removal of sex offenders. In fact, Facebook’s terms of service indicate that sex
offenders are not permitted to use the website.249
However, the federal government assisting Facebook in removing sex offenders
from the website may violate the First Amendment. If there is no direct state action,
there is not typically a constitutional concern.250 Nevertheless, the government is
facilitating the abridgement of speech by a private actor, and in some
circumstances, the Supreme Court has found that similar government action
violates the First Amendment.251 Ultimately, this complex constitutional issue is
beyond the scope of this Note, but it is noteworthy that such government activity
would at least be less speech restrictive than blanket social media bans because
there will always be some social media utility on the vast expanse of the Internet
that will keep its doors open to all comers.
Without resorting to helping social media shut their doors to sex offenders, there
is a strong possibility that a constitutional social networking ban could be crafted.

247. Barnaby Grzaslewicz, Comment, Banished from the Virtual Sandbox: How State
Bans on Sex Offender Social Networking Access Implicates the Freedom of Speech, 32
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 85, 118–19 (2013).
248. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16915b (Supp. V 2011) (mandating the creation of a system
“that permits social networking websites to compare the information contained in the
National Sex Offender Registry with the Internet identifiers of users of the social networking
websites”).
249. Kashmir Hill, So Which Social Networking Sites Can Sex Offenders Actually Use?,
FORBES.COM (June 21, 2012, 12:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/06
/21/so-which-social-networking-sites-can-sex-offenders-actually-use/; Michael Martinez,
New La. Law: Sex Offenders Must List Status on Facebook, Other Social Media, CNN.COM
(June 21, 2012, 12:49 PM EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/20/tech/louisiana-sex
-offenders-social-media/index.html (“[Facebook’s] Statement of Rights and Responsibilities
already bars sex offenders from using it.”).
250. Cf. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 565 (1974).
251. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that First Amendment
rights can extend onto private property, and creating the foundations of the “quasimunicipality doctrine”); see also Peter Sinclair, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Virtual
World, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 231, 245–57 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
“quasi-municipality doctrine” should apply to online gaming communities). Presumably, if
the protection provided by the “quasi-municipality doctrine” were to extend to online
gaming communities, it would also extend to social networks, but the “quasi-municipality
doctrine” has not yet been applied in such a way by any court.

1362

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1327

The Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Marion County specifically made clear that it was
not “foreclose[ing] the possibility that keeping certain sex offenders off social
networks advances the state’s interest in ways distinct from the existing
justifications” for Indiana’s social media ban.252 The court seems to be implying
that perhaps the state could redesign social media bans to serve the state’s interest
in preventing recidivism, or in other words, the state could create a ban that would
apply only to those individuals who would not be able to prevent themselves from
committing sex crimes if exposed to social media. Later in the opinion, the Seventh
Circuit observed that a permissible law might be able to be created that would
“apply to certain persons that present an acute risk—those individuals whose
presence on social media impels them to solicit children.”253
To target only individuals who present an “acute risk” of recidivism, an ideal
social media ban could be crafted that would only become effective against a
particular individual if the state demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that
a given sex offender would be likely to reoffend if permitted to access social
media.254 The ideal social media ban would also include a mechanism for sex
offenders banned from social media to seek review of the determination that they
are likely to reoffend if permitted to access social media. Such a social media ban
would surely survive the narrow-tailoring requirement, for the social media ban
would be “neither over- nor under-inclusive.”255 The only potential constitutional
issue would be a failure to leave open ample alternative channels of
communication,256 but it seems even this stark constitutional requirement would be
bent by the overwhelming weight of a social media ban tightly tailored to serve
such an exceptionally important state interest.257
CONCLUSION
Although states have an extremely important interest in protecting children, they
must do so in constitutionally permissible ways. Current social media bans
accomplish little in the way of protecting children—because the conduct they seek
to proscribe is already illegal. Yet, they inhibit access to a medium of
communication that is already extremely important in our society. Social media
will likely continue to grow in importance as an ever growing number of
individuals abandon traditional mediums of communication and begin
communicating primarily through social media. As people migrate to social media,

252. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 2013).
253. Id. at 702.
254. The Seventh Circuit seemed to imply that a limited social media ban, like the
aforementioned, would survive constitutional scrutiny. See id.
255. Id. at 699.
256. See supra Part III.C.2.
257. This ideal social media ban was crafted based on the sex offender civil commitment
statute approved by the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). As the
Seventh Circuit recognized, “Hendricks-style civil commitment presents a far greater
deprivation of liberty than banning social networking.” Doe v. Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d at
702. Therefore, as long as the Hendricks procedural safeguards are tracked, it seems likely
that a social media ban would be found to be constitutional.
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so too will the debates surrounding the important political and economic issues
facing the United States and the world. The First Amendment should protect access
to this important medium of communication for as many individuals as possible,
regardless of their criminal history.

